Animals and Man Essay -- Analysis, G.W. Leibniz

G.W. Leibniz asserts that human beings are superior to all other creatures. Admittedly, Leibnizs ideas on this matter are somewhat ambiguous, making it difficult to limit his exact position. In some instances within the Discourse on Metaphysics, he appears to hold that animals do not have souls. On other occasions, however, he seems to express beliefs to the contrary. For example, Leibniz first expresses doubt ab disclose souls of animals when he questions if they animals have whatsoever souls (Leibniz, 11). In another example, on the contrary, he hints that the souls of other bodies are solely different from smart souls (12). This gives the impression that both other bodies and humans (intelligent souls) have souls albeit different to some degree. Later, however, Leibniz definitively remarks that animals have souls (37). In The Monadology, whatsoever stay uncertainty vanishes. Here, he first mentions that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the c are she has interpreted to furnish them organs (71). Then, a few words later Leibniz vows to pardon how what occurs in the soul represents what occurs in the organs (71). What he implies with this passage is that animals, rightful(prenominal) like humans, have souls which are influenced and impacted by sensory perceptions. Then, in XXVI of The Monadology, he explains that memory provides a kind of sequence in souls, which imitates reason, plainly which must be distinguished from it (71). Leibniz continues, providing an example of a dog retrieve abuse with a stick to suggest that animals have some social class of memory or perception. As a result of the memories of abuse and a recollection of the pain, the dog flees when presented with a stick. In arguing as much, Lei... ...ecies. Since humans cannot catch prey, without the use of tools or weaponry, as efficiently as a lion, the lion could then be deemed superior. Reframing what supposedly makes man superior out of an anthropocentric view hopefully elucidate the idea that no trace makes any being superior over any other.I jib with Leibniz that a mind created in the image of god should, indeed, act with noesis in imitation of the divine nature (39). This includes acting as chaste agents to consider the good and inherent worth of all beings. After all, in many respects, animals and man are very similar. But, assuming human favorable position is an abuse of our unique position as moral agents of God. Moreover, if we believe God has infinite and perfect virtues who acts in a divine nature, then it seems that such(prenominal) an omnibenevolent being would not value any creature over any other.